The April 24, 1967, cosmonaut Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov killed when his Soyuz 1 capsule hit the ground at high speed. Komarov was the first cosmonaut who died during a space mission and for many years the details of his death were surrounded by a halo of mystery. It was not until perestroika the late 80's to know what happened exactly with the Soyuz 1. Unfortunately, during those years also many rumors leaked out that over time have acquired status of truths. Today it is still customary to read books and articles that reflect these unfounded myths. And the sad thing is that we now have at our disposal all the time files. This is the true story of the Soyuz 1.
Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov .
The Soyuz and the lunar program
In 1966 the Soviet space program was going through a critical situation. While in the United States, NASA put in place the various elements to put a man on the moon in the USSR, the indecision of the government had succeeded in crippling the Soviet response to Apollo program. The death of the great chief engineer Sergey Korolyov in 1966 had been a blow to the design bureau OKB-1 and its plan of N1-L3 Moon landing. However, Vasili Mishin, Korolev's successor as head of the OKB-1, hoping to be able to launch a cosmonaut around the moon before the Americans with L1/Zond ships. Both the program and the N1-L3 L1 made use of a vehicle common, the Soyuz spacecraft ("union" in Russian). But to ensure the success of the lunar adventure, the Soyuz would first show itself in low Earth orbit. The version of the Soyuz for orbital flight was called 7K-OK ( Orbitalni Korabl / Орбитальный Корабль "orbiter") or 11F615. It consisted of three modules: the orbital module (BO, Bitovoi Otsek / Бытовой Отсек, БО), the capsule SA ( Apparat Spuskaemi / Спускаемый Аппарат, СА) and the service module PAO ( Priborn-Agregatni Otsek / Приборно-Агрегатный Отсек, ПАО).
Sergey Korolyov (left) and Vasily Mishin, the first leaders of the OKB-1/TsKBEM/Energía.
Zond/7K-L1 Nave.
Detailed model of the Soyuz LOK for the N1-L3 Programme by Vadim Lukashevich (www.buran.ru).
ground testing the first prototype of the 7K-OK spacecraft began on May 12, 1966, much later than expected. The ship had many defects that the very Nikolai Kamanin, the head of the Cosmonaut Training Center (TsPK) wrote in his diary strong criticism on the design of the vehicle. Mid, 1966, the State Commission created to oversee the 7K-OK program decided that the first mission of the Soyuz would be the coupling of two unmanned spacecraft in orbit down by Igla system. Until then, the engineers of OKB-1 (then called TsKBEM) expected to launch two missions before automatic solo to refine the various systems. But time was pressing. There was a moon race to win and the State Commission decided to delete these test flights.
Soyuz 7K-OK (Novosti Kosmonavtiki / RKK Energy).
The first two 7K-OK spacecraft arrived at the Baikonur cosmodrome in August. The launch was scheduled for September. First take off the 7K-OK (A) No. 2, a Soyuz with pluggable system (or "male"). Would follow 24 hours after the 7K-OK (P) No 1 with a passive ("female"). If all went well, the two ships would couple and fly in formation for three days. The technicians were confident that the first manned flight could take off in December.
Nave 7K-OK (A), active.
Soyuz 7K-OK (P).
Finally, on November 28, 1966 at 16:00 Moscow time a rocket was launched from Baikonur 11A511-derived Semiorka-R-7 with the first Soyuz . Once placed in an orbit of 181 x 232 km would be named Kosmos 133 . The problems began immediately. A fuel leak in the orbital maneuvering system (DPO) caused the tank pressure to fall from 340 atmospheres to 38 atmospheres in less than two minutes. Fifteen minutes later, the Kosmos 133 had lost all its fuel in this system and was running at two revolutions per minute. The link with the 7K-OK (P) was given up as lost and canceled its release.
But the guidance system also failed, so it was impossible to maneuver the spacecraft for the ignition of the main engine braking (SKDU). After many attempts, the engineers were able to slow the spacecraft system using the other orientation (DO) and the auxiliary motor (DKD) rather than the main motor. On 30 November the ship made reentry, but the capsule disappeared from radar screens when it was at about 70-100 kilometers high and 200 kilometers from the city of Orsk. The self-destruct system, consisting of 23 kg of TNT, had been activated to ensure that the Soyuz could land in China. The wreckage ended up falling on the Marianas Islands in the Pacific Ocean.
loss capsule deprived engineers valuable information to improve systems ship. The State Commission and Mishin was agreed to launch the next 7K-OK (P) on a solo flight. From the ship was heading into space on December 14, 1966 at 14:30, but the launch was aborted seconds before liftoff. A few minutes later, while technicians inspected the Soyuz rocket, the escape tower (SAS) was activated unexpectedly fire the launcher. Technicians immediately fled the area and ran to seek refuge in the bunker. Just in time, because shortly after the Soyuz, carrying fuel to the brim, exploded destroying the ramp area and killing 31 more Korostylov. The capsule of the second 7K-OK landed without a scratch within walking distance of the ramp.
After this tragedy was not until the February 7, 1967 for the second Soyuz (7K-OK (P) No 3) in space, to be christened Kosmos 140. The launch had been canceled the day before by a technical failure. In the fourth orbit, the stellar sensor guidance system failed and lost again maneuvering fuel. On February 9 the ship began reentry, but the control system failed and the capsule was forced to perform a ballistic descent. The rescue team would find the iceberg on the Aral Sea, at 510 kilometers from the area expected. Before they could reach she sank into the sea. And that was supposed that the capsule should float. The depth was not excessive, not ten yards, so he could be rescued with the help of a helicopter Mil Mi-6. Upon inspecting the vehicle engineers discovered with horror inch hole in the heat shield in place that should be installed a temperature sensor. If you had taken the Kosmos 140 crew, cosmonaut would have died from decompression sickness (not wearing a space suit) and then have sunk into the seabed.
coupling system between two Soyuz 7K-OK showing extravehicular activity required to move from one ship to another (Soyuz 4 and 5).
The Soyuz 1
It did not take an expert to realize that the 7K-OK was not ready for manned flight. Unfortunately, the State Commission and Mishin thought this was a good opportunity to advance to NASA, now mired in utter confusion after the tragedy of Apollo 1. On March 25, 1967 it was decided to continue with the original plan. The next manned Soyuz would not only, but also carry out an ambitious mission that included a link to another 7K-OK (Soyuz 2) that would carry three crew. After mating, two astronauts would perform an extravehicular activity (EVA) and the Soyuz 2 would the Soyuz 1. Manned mission would be the most complex to date.
Soyuz 7K-OK for integration on the ground. Protective covers can be seen green (against the vacuum and temperature changes) that cover the entire ship, but some parts (radiator) of the propulsion module (below).
Vladimir Komarov was elegidocomandante of the Soyuz 1, Yuri Gagarin reserve. Valeri Bykovsky, Alexei Yeliseyev and Yevgeni Jrunov would be the crew of the Soyuz 2. Jrunov Yeliseyev and should perform the EVA suits and return Yastreb with Komarov on Soyuz 1. After a short but intense training, the astronauts would travel from Moscow to Baikonur on several flights between 6 and 14 April. That same day, the State Commission tentatively decided to set the release date for April 24. The Soyuz 1 lift off from Area 1 or "Gagarin ramp, while the Soyuz 2 would from Area 31.
Komarov during training for the mission.
Crew of Soyuz 1 and Soyuz 2 with Yuri Gagarin.
April 15, at 23:00 began the refueling of the Soyuz 1. The Soyuz 2 would receive its load of hypergolic propellants on 17 April. Three days after the State Commission met to confirm the composition of the crew and decided that the launch of the Soyuz 1 would take place on 23 April at 3:55 Moscow time. The Soyuz 2 was off on April 24 at 03:10. The day came and Komarov key rose shortly after midnight local time. After to undergo a medical checkup donned his flight suit, a simple gray cotton mono, and he left the launch pad at 03:00. They took leave of the Commissioners, among whom were Mishin and Kamanin. Gagarin himself Komarov accompanied to the entrance hatch of the ship.
At the scheduled time, the Soyuz 1 (7K-OK (A) No. 4) took off with Komarov inside, becoming the first cosmonaut who performed a second space flight. Once in orbit was 196.2 x 225 km, the nightmare began. The left panel of the Soyuz failed to deploy and also missed a telemetry antenna, the wave communications system short and the solar sensor 45K. This sensor was responsible for maintaining the ship facing the Sun continuously. With a solar panel out of service and without proper guidance, the electric current decreased to 14 amps, well below normal.
So should have been Soyuz 1-Soyuz 2.
Komarov tried to guide the ship during the fifth orbit using manual control and sensor system of ions, but without much success. To his despair he found it very difficult to determine the spacecraft orientation with respect to horizon. Between the seventh and the thirteenth orbit, Komarov should take the opportunity to sleep out of reach of Soviet shortwave stations. Upon completion of this period, the cosmonaut announced that the ion orientation system failed again. Bad news because no operational guidance system was unable to return to Earth. At this point it was clear that the link with the Soyuz 2 was impossible, so that the State Commission decided to cancel the mission and ordering the return of Komarov at the 17 th orbit. The three crew of the Soyuz 2 complained bitterly about the "excessive caution" by the Commission.
But in the 15 th orbit Komarov reported ion system finally worked again. The engineers proceeded to calculate the information necessary for reentry. Before losing radio contact, Gagarin diligently passed them. Mishin and Kamanin wished him luck. The ship's computer should start braking sequence on the 2:56, but when it came time nothing happened. The engine was not running. Apparently, the guidance system had failed again to pass through the ship area sparsely ions while flying over the night side of the planet.
was decided to bring back the 18 th Komarov and Gagarin orbit proceeded to send a new set of data. The ignition and 150 seconds long, would take place at 05:57. Before entering the Earth's shadow, Komarov should ensure that the spacecraft was oriented with the front engine. Then have to wait until the gyroscopes KI-38 held the position during the night journey. This time the guidance system worked and the engine was turned on at the scheduled time, although the length is slightly lower than expected (146 seconds). To the alarm of the drivers, the signal "Fault-2" was activated on the instrument panel of the Soyuz. Luckily it was not any major failure. The computer decided to cancel the nominal decrease in noting that the center of gravity of the ship was not where was because of the folded solar panel. The spacecraft would carry out a ballistic descent Komarov should support a higher than normal deceleration (about 8 g), but nothing serious. After lighting, Komarov moved into a center seat in the capsule.
Inside a 7K-OK Soyuz capsule.
Soyuz capsule. The parachute container to the right.
Soyuz TMA capsule where you can see the main parachute container (NASA).
Vista
parachute a Soyuz TMA (NASA).
sequence of the Soyuz descent to the main canopy (left) and standby (right) (RKK Energia).
initiated the reentry capsule fifteen minutes after the end of the ignition. Communications were interrupted because of the plasma layer formed around the ship while the heat shield reached more than 2000 ° C. A few minutes later he could hear the quiet voice reciting Komarov parameters down thanks to the VHF antenna located on the main hatch. The Soyuz 1 was about to return home.
The tragedy occurred when it was his turn to parachute. The procedure required to first deploy a small parachute, the pilot parachute, which should stabilize the capsule and pull the main parachute. As expected, the parachute container cover was ejected and then the pilot parachute out. But against all odds, the main parachute stayed inside the container. Was unheard of. In the hundreds of simulations and tests never happened something similar. The ship's computer detected that the rate of fall did not diminish, a sign that there is something wrong with the main parachute. The reserve parachute was activated automatically, but unfortunately became entangled with the parachute pilot was already unfolded and its leadership failed to open properly. The ship rushed with no possibility of stopping its descent. Komarov knew it was going to die. Vladimir
later died when his capsule crashed about 150 km / h (the reserve parachute partially deployed had helped reduce terminal velocity). The impact was fatal necessity, but even worse was the explosion and subsequent fire. Due to the high rate of descent, the heat shield had failed to spread to three kilometers high as expected. A few meters from the ground, solid fuel rockets of the capsule is activated to stop the fall, a worthless work this time. But being the heat shield still in place, the fireworks caused an explosion inside the car to be fueled by the 30 kg hydrogen peroxide system to maneuver the ship.
Rear Soyuz capsule without the heat shield. Be seen the four solid-fuel engines on the sides DMP.
Contrary to popular belief, Komarov remained silent during his last seconds of life . Do not shout or praise turned to their homeland. Nor cursed the engineers who designed the vehicle. If you said something, he kept to himself. The capsule was equipped with a "black box" in which they could record the conversations of the cosmonaut.
Members of the rescue team aboard an Ilyushin Il-14 were the first who flew over the crash site and reported that Soyuz 1 was on fire. A helicopter landed a hundred yards from the capsule shortly after. Rescuers thought they might have survived Komarov and perhaps was out of the ship, so I inspected the area. A few minutes later, Nikolai Kamanin landed in the city of Orsk waiting to be received by Komarov. They told of the tragedy and immediately went to the scene. When he arrived, the capsule was still in flames. At this point it was clear that Komarov was dead and his body was inside the ship. Kamanin gave orders to put out the fire with dirt and proceeded to remove the charred body of the cosmonaut. Komarov's remains were found at 09:30 and taken to Moscow for autopsy. Komarov on April 26 would be buried with full honors in the Kremlin wall as a Soviet hero. A few days later, a group of Pioneers who came to honor the fallen hero Komarov found more remains in the area and decided to bury them. Several cosmonauts also came to the scene to pay tribute to his former comrade.
Remains of the Soyuz capsule 1 after impact. Komarov's body was still inside the vehicle when these pictures were taken.
Remains of the Soyuz 1.
Cosmonauts and engineers from OKB-1 Komarov pay homage to the scene of the tragedy (RKK Energia).
was clear that Komarov died because of an incorrect deployment of the parachute, but was to determine the cause of this strange event. According to the official investigation, the parachute had been incorrectly folded before being inserted into the container. To avoid a similar tragedy, we decided to change the shape of the containers, which would be tapered rather than cylindrical. Also incorporated a pilot parachute to pull over to pull the main parachute and a control system to facilitate the deployment manual.
However, years after it was learned that the main cause of the tragedy had nothing to do with the folding of the parachute. Prior to launch, and as usual, the capsule of the Soyuz 1 was coated with an organic resin that should be part of the heat shield ablation. Then the ship was introduced in an oven to cure the resin. For reasons still unknown, the parachute containers even empty-then-no and stopped this process. Resin vaporized entered into containers, resulting in increased roughness of the walls. As a result, the Soyuz 1 parachute failed to deploy due to excessive friction presented by the container. This botched attempt was uncovered by the upper echelons of the OKB-1, although the system manager manned parachute design office was fired. The really terrible part is that the capsule 2 was also subjected to the same polymerization process. Has been released, it is possible that the four cosmonauts have died after returning from space.
Soyuz 1 was a predictable failure and resulted in the loss of innocence for the young space program Soviet. It was obvious that the ship was not ready for manned flight. The most important consequence of the tragedy was the cessation of the N1-L3 lunar programs and L1. If not a miracle happened, the USSR could make up for lost the moon race, as indeed it was.
Komarov's name on the surface of the moon on a list of fallen astronauts.
References:
Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov .
The Soyuz and the lunar program
In 1966 the Soviet space program was going through a critical situation. While in the United States, NASA put in place the various elements to put a man on the moon in the USSR, the indecision of the government had succeeded in crippling the Soviet response to Apollo program. The death of the great chief engineer Sergey Korolyov in 1966 had been a blow to the design bureau OKB-1 and its plan of N1-L3 Moon landing. However, Vasili Mishin, Korolev's successor as head of the OKB-1, hoping to be able to launch a cosmonaut around the moon before the Americans with L1/Zond ships. Both the program and the N1-L3 L1 made use of a vehicle common, the Soyuz spacecraft ("union" in Russian). But to ensure the success of the lunar adventure, the Soyuz would first show itself in low Earth orbit. The version of the Soyuz for orbital flight was called 7K-OK ( Orbitalni Korabl / Орбитальный Корабль "orbiter") or 11F615. It consisted of three modules: the orbital module (BO, Bitovoi Otsek / Бытовой Отсек, БО), the capsule SA ( Apparat Spuskaemi / Спускаемый Аппарат, СА) and the service module PAO ( Priborn-Agregatni Otsek / Приборно-Агрегатный Отсек, ПАО).
Sergey Korolyov (left) and Vasily Mishin, the first leaders of the OKB-1/TsKBEM/Energía.
Zond/7K-L1 Nave.
Detailed model of the Soyuz LOK for the N1-L3 Programme by Vadim Lukashevich (www.buran.ru).
ground testing the first prototype of the 7K-OK spacecraft began on May 12, 1966, much later than expected. The ship had many defects that the very Nikolai Kamanin, the head of the Cosmonaut Training Center (TsPK) wrote in his diary strong criticism on the design of the vehicle. Mid, 1966, the State Commission created to oversee the 7K-OK program decided that the first mission of the Soyuz would be the coupling of two unmanned spacecraft in orbit down by Igla system. Until then, the engineers of OKB-1 (then called TsKBEM) expected to launch two missions before automatic solo to refine the various systems. But time was pressing. There was a moon race to win and the State Commission decided to delete these test flights.
Soyuz 7K-OK (Novosti Kosmonavtiki / RKK Energy).
The first two 7K-OK spacecraft arrived at the Baikonur cosmodrome in August. The launch was scheduled for September. First take off the 7K-OK (A) No. 2, a Soyuz with pluggable system (or "male"). Would follow 24 hours after the 7K-OK (P) No 1 with a passive ("female"). If all went well, the two ships would couple and fly in formation for three days. The technicians were confident that the first manned flight could take off in December.
Nave 7K-OK (A), active.
Soyuz 7K-OK (P).
Finally, on November 28, 1966 at 16:00 Moscow time a rocket was launched from Baikonur 11A511-derived Semiorka-R-7 with the first Soyuz . Once placed in an orbit of 181 x 232 km would be named Kosmos 133 . The problems began immediately. A fuel leak in the orbital maneuvering system (DPO) caused the tank pressure to fall from 340 atmospheres to 38 atmospheres in less than two minutes. Fifteen minutes later, the Kosmos 133 had lost all its fuel in this system and was running at two revolutions per minute. The link with the 7K-OK (P) was given up as lost and canceled its release.
But the guidance system also failed, so it was impossible to maneuver the spacecraft for the ignition of the main engine braking (SKDU). After many attempts, the engineers were able to slow the spacecraft system using the other orientation (DO) and the auxiliary motor (DKD) rather than the main motor. On 30 November the ship made reentry, but the capsule disappeared from radar screens when it was at about 70-100 kilometers high and 200 kilometers from the city of Orsk. The self-destruct system, consisting of 23 kg of TNT, had been activated to ensure that the Soyuz could land in China. The wreckage ended up falling on the Marianas Islands in the Pacific Ocean.
loss capsule deprived engineers valuable information to improve systems ship. The State Commission and Mishin was agreed to launch the next 7K-OK (P) on a solo flight. From the ship was heading into space on December 14, 1966 at 14:30, but the launch was aborted seconds before liftoff. A few minutes later, while technicians inspected the Soyuz rocket, the escape tower (SAS) was activated unexpectedly fire the launcher. Technicians immediately fled the area and ran to seek refuge in the bunker. Just in time, because shortly after the Soyuz, carrying fuel to the brim, exploded destroying the ramp area and killing 31 more Korostylov. The capsule of the second 7K-OK landed without a scratch within walking distance of the ramp.
After this tragedy was not until the February 7, 1967 for the second Soyuz (7K-OK (P) No 3) in space, to be christened Kosmos 140. The launch had been canceled the day before by a technical failure. In the fourth orbit, the stellar sensor guidance system failed and lost again maneuvering fuel. On February 9 the ship began reentry, but the control system failed and the capsule was forced to perform a ballistic descent. The rescue team would find the iceberg on the Aral Sea, at 510 kilometers from the area expected. Before they could reach she sank into the sea. And that was supposed that the capsule should float. The depth was not excessive, not ten yards, so he could be rescued with the help of a helicopter Mil Mi-6. Upon inspecting the vehicle engineers discovered with horror inch hole in the heat shield in place that should be installed a temperature sensor. If you had taken the Kosmos 140 crew, cosmonaut would have died from decompression sickness (not wearing a space suit) and then have sunk into the seabed.
coupling system between two Soyuz 7K-OK showing extravehicular activity required to move from one ship to another (Soyuz 4 and 5).
The Soyuz 1
It did not take an expert to realize that the 7K-OK was not ready for manned flight. Unfortunately, the State Commission and Mishin thought this was a good opportunity to advance to NASA, now mired in utter confusion after the tragedy of Apollo 1. On March 25, 1967 it was decided to continue with the original plan. The next manned Soyuz would not only, but also carry out an ambitious mission that included a link to another 7K-OK (Soyuz 2) that would carry three crew. After mating, two astronauts would perform an extravehicular activity (EVA) and the Soyuz 2 would the Soyuz 1. Manned mission would be the most complex to date.
Soyuz 7K-OK for integration on the ground. Protective covers can be seen green (against the vacuum and temperature changes) that cover the entire ship, but some parts (radiator) of the propulsion module (below).
Vladimir Komarov was elegidocomandante of the Soyuz 1, Yuri Gagarin reserve. Valeri Bykovsky, Alexei Yeliseyev and Yevgeni Jrunov would be the crew of the Soyuz 2. Jrunov Yeliseyev and should perform the EVA suits and return Yastreb with Komarov on Soyuz 1. After a short but intense training, the astronauts would travel from Moscow to Baikonur on several flights between 6 and 14 April. That same day, the State Commission tentatively decided to set the release date for April 24. The Soyuz 1 lift off from Area 1 or "Gagarin ramp, while the Soyuz 2 would from Area 31.
Komarov during training for the mission.
Crew of Soyuz 1 and Soyuz 2 with Yuri Gagarin.
April 15, at 23:00 began the refueling of the Soyuz 1. The Soyuz 2 would receive its load of hypergolic propellants on 17 April. Three days after the State Commission met to confirm the composition of the crew and decided that the launch of the Soyuz 1 would take place on 23 April at 3:55 Moscow time. The Soyuz 2 was off on April 24 at 03:10. The day came and Komarov key rose shortly after midnight local time. After to undergo a medical checkup donned his flight suit, a simple gray cotton mono, and he left the launch pad at 03:00. They took leave of the Commissioners, among whom were Mishin and Kamanin. Gagarin himself Komarov accompanied to the entrance hatch of the ship.
At the scheduled time, the Soyuz 1 (7K-OK (A) No. 4) took off with Komarov inside, becoming the first cosmonaut who performed a second space flight. Once in orbit was 196.2 x 225 km, the nightmare began. The left panel of the Soyuz failed to deploy and also missed a telemetry antenna, the wave communications system short and the solar sensor 45K. This sensor was responsible for maintaining the ship facing the Sun continuously. With a solar panel out of service and without proper guidance, the electric current decreased to 14 amps, well below normal.
So should have been Soyuz 1-Soyuz 2.
Komarov tried to guide the ship during the fifth orbit using manual control and sensor system of ions, but without much success. To his despair he found it very difficult to determine the spacecraft orientation with respect to horizon. Between the seventh and the thirteenth orbit, Komarov should take the opportunity to sleep out of reach of Soviet shortwave stations. Upon completion of this period, the cosmonaut announced that the ion orientation system failed again. Bad news because no operational guidance system was unable to return to Earth. At this point it was clear that the link with the Soyuz 2 was impossible, so that the State Commission decided to cancel the mission and ordering the return of Komarov at the 17 th orbit. The three crew of the Soyuz 2 complained bitterly about the "excessive caution" by the Commission.
But in the 15 th orbit Komarov reported ion system finally worked again. The engineers proceeded to calculate the information necessary for reentry. Before losing radio contact, Gagarin diligently passed them. Mishin and Kamanin wished him luck. The ship's computer should start braking sequence on the 2:56, but when it came time nothing happened. The engine was not running. Apparently, the guidance system had failed again to pass through the ship area sparsely ions while flying over the night side of the planet.
was decided to bring back the 18 th Komarov and Gagarin orbit proceeded to send a new set of data. The ignition and 150 seconds long, would take place at 05:57. Before entering the Earth's shadow, Komarov should ensure that the spacecraft was oriented with the front engine. Then have to wait until the gyroscopes KI-38 held the position during the night journey. This time the guidance system worked and the engine was turned on at the scheduled time, although the length is slightly lower than expected (146 seconds). To the alarm of the drivers, the signal "Fault-2" was activated on the instrument panel of the Soyuz. Luckily it was not any major failure. The computer decided to cancel the nominal decrease in noting that the center of gravity of the ship was not where was because of the folded solar panel. The spacecraft would carry out a ballistic descent Komarov should support a higher than normal deceleration (about 8 g), but nothing serious. After lighting, Komarov moved into a center seat in the capsule.
Inside a 7K-OK Soyuz capsule.
Soyuz capsule. The parachute container to the right.
Soyuz TMA capsule where you can see the main parachute container (NASA).
Vista parachute a Soyuz TMA (NASA).
sequence of the Soyuz descent to the main canopy (left) and standby (right) (RKK Energia).
initiated the reentry capsule fifteen minutes after the end of the ignition. Communications were interrupted because of the plasma layer formed around the ship while the heat shield reached more than 2000 ° C. A few minutes later he could hear the quiet voice reciting Komarov parameters down thanks to the VHF antenna located on the main hatch. The Soyuz 1 was about to return home.
The tragedy occurred when it was his turn to parachute. The procedure required to first deploy a small parachute, the pilot parachute, which should stabilize the capsule and pull the main parachute. As expected, the parachute container cover was ejected and then the pilot parachute out. But against all odds, the main parachute stayed inside the container. Was unheard of. In the hundreds of simulations and tests never happened something similar. The ship's computer detected that the rate of fall did not diminish, a sign that there is something wrong with the main parachute. The reserve parachute was activated automatically, but unfortunately became entangled with the parachute pilot was already unfolded and its leadership failed to open properly. The ship rushed with no possibility of stopping its descent. Komarov knew it was going to die. Vladimir
later died when his capsule crashed about 150 km / h (the reserve parachute partially deployed had helped reduce terminal velocity). The impact was fatal necessity, but even worse was the explosion and subsequent fire. Due to the high rate of descent, the heat shield had failed to spread to three kilometers high as expected. A few meters from the ground, solid fuel rockets of the capsule is activated to stop the fall, a worthless work this time. But being the heat shield still in place, the fireworks caused an explosion inside the car to be fueled by the 30 kg hydrogen peroxide system to maneuver the ship.
Rear Soyuz capsule without the heat shield. Be seen the four solid-fuel engines on the sides DMP.
Contrary to popular belief, Komarov remained silent during his last seconds of life . Do not shout or praise turned to their homeland. Nor cursed the engineers who designed the vehicle. If you said something, he kept to himself. The capsule was equipped with a "black box" in which they could record the conversations of the cosmonaut.
Members of the rescue team aboard an Ilyushin Il-14 were the first who flew over the crash site and reported that Soyuz 1 was on fire. A helicopter landed a hundred yards from the capsule shortly after. Rescuers thought they might have survived Komarov and perhaps was out of the ship, so I inspected the area. A few minutes later, Nikolai Kamanin landed in the city of Orsk waiting to be received by Komarov. They told of the tragedy and immediately went to the scene. When he arrived, the capsule was still in flames. At this point it was clear that Komarov was dead and his body was inside the ship. Kamanin gave orders to put out the fire with dirt and proceeded to remove the charred body of the cosmonaut. Komarov's remains were found at 09:30 and taken to Moscow for autopsy. Komarov on April 26 would be buried with full honors in the Kremlin wall as a Soviet hero. A few days later, a group of Pioneers who came to honor the fallen hero Komarov found more remains in the area and decided to bury them. Several cosmonauts also came to the scene to pay tribute to his former comrade.
Remains of the Soyuz capsule 1 after impact. Komarov's body was still inside the vehicle when these pictures were taken.
Remains of the Soyuz 1.
Cosmonauts and engineers from OKB-1 Komarov pay homage to the scene of the tragedy (RKK Energia).
was clear that Komarov died because of an incorrect deployment of the parachute, but was to determine the cause of this strange event. According to the official investigation, the parachute had been incorrectly folded before being inserted into the container. To avoid a similar tragedy, we decided to change the shape of the containers, which would be tapered rather than cylindrical. Also incorporated a pilot parachute to pull over to pull the main parachute and a control system to facilitate the deployment manual.
However, years after it was learned that the main cause of the tragedy had nothing to do with the folding of the parachute. Prior to launch, and as usual, the capsule of the Soyuz 1 was coated with an organic resin that should be part of the heat shield ablation. Then the ship was introduced in an oven to cure the resin. For reasons still unknown, the parachute containers even empty-then-no and stopped this process. Resin vaporized entered into containers, resulting in increased roughness of the walls. As a result, the Soyuz 1 parachute failed to deploy due to excessive friction presented by the container. This botched attempt was uncovered by the upper echelons of the OKB-1, although the system manager manned parachute design office was fired. The really terrible part is that the capsule 2 was also subjected to the same polymerization process. Has been released, it is possible that the four cosmonauts have died after returning from space.
Soyuz 1 was a predictable failure and resulted in the loss of innocence for the young space program Soviet. It was obvious that the ship was not ready for manned flight. The most important consequence of the tragedy was the cessation of the N1-L3 lunar programs and L1. If not a miracle happened, the USSR could make up for lost the moon race, as indeed it was.
Komarov's name on the surface of the moon on a list of fallen astronauts.
References:
- History of the Soyuz.
- Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge , Asif A. Siddiqi (University Press of Florida, 2003).
- Raketi i Liudi , Boris Chertok (Mashinostroenie Moscow 1999).
- imeni SP Korolev RKK Energia (Ed. Menonsovpoligraf, 1996).
- S oyuz, a universal spacecraft , Rex D. And David J. Hall Shayler (Springer Praxis, 2003).
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